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THE STANDING DICHOTOMY IN RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION SUITS UNDER THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT AND TITLE I OF
THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACT (HCDA)
The courts and legislatures of the United States have long recognized
the problem of discrimination in the sale and rental of property.' By
enacting the Fair Housing Act (FHA),2 Congress made it easier to
mount a legal challenge against racially discriminatory conduct. Sub-
sequently, courts liberalized standing requirements for FHA suits in
accordance with legislative intent.3 Nevertheless, parties challenging
the discriminatory use of federal grants under Title I of the Housing
and Community Development Act (HCDA)4 face major obstacles to
judicial resolution of their claims.5 This Note examines the divergent
1. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued executive order 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652,
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), which prohibited discrimination in federally as-
sisted housing programs. Two years later, Congress passed Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-5 (1982), prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin. The scope of the 1964 Act, like the executive
order, was limited to federally funded programs. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982), extended the national fair
housing policy to the private sector. See infra notes 16 through 22 and accompanying
text. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-
22 (1968), held that Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982), to prohibit all discrimination against blacks in the sale or rental of property.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
3. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
5. See infra notes 68 through 78 and accompanying text.
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approaches taken by federal courts in analyzing standing issues under
both the FHA and Title I of the HCDA and exposes their inconsisten-
cies in light of similar policies and provisions in each Act.
I. THE DocTRINE OF STANDING-AN OVERVIEW
Before a federal court will adjudicate her claim, a litigant must
demonstrate that she has standing to bring the action.6 This condition
stems from article III of the Constitution, which defines the judicial
power of federal courts and limits their jurisdiction to actual cases and
controversies.7 To establish a controversy, a plaintiff must prove that
she has standing to sue in federal court.' The threshold article III test
requires a litigant to allege that she suffered an injury-in-fact, 9 that the
injury is traceable to the challenged conduct, ° and that a favorable
decision is likely to redress the injury.11
6. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) ("[The Supreme Court] has always
required that a litigant have 'standing'....").
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority;-to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to controversies be-
tween two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;-between
citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under
grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states, citizens or subjects.
8. See Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 471 (1981).
9. See Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 472; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) (the Court held that under article III, standing is
determined by whether the plaintiff suffered a personal injury and consequently alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to warrant invoking federal
court jurisdiction); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (a federal court
has jurisdiction only when the plaintiff himself suffered some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the "putatively illegal conduct"); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 152 (1969) (injury-in-fact may be economic or otherwise).
10. See Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 472; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
11. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38; Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 472-73, requiring
an actual injury redressable by court serve several policies inherent in article III, thus
allowing the court to "decide the case with some confidence that its decision will not
pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually
decided by. the courts." Id. at 472. The article III standing requirements also ensure
that the judicial process will not become a forum "for the ventilation of public griev-
ances." Id. at 473. The case and controversy requirement of article III "forecloses the
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Under the Supreme Court's prudential guidelines for standing, the
plaintiff must be the proper party to litigate the claim.12 The Court
requires that even if a litigant alleges an injury sufficient to meet article
III standards, she may not assert a claim based upon a third party's
legal rights or interests.' 3 The Court may also deny standing when the
plaintiff asserts a generalized complaint, rather than an individual in-
jury, since such an issue may require legislative resolution.14 Finally,
the Court requires that the plaintiff's interest must fall within the zone
of interests protected or regulated by a statute or constitutional
guarantee. 
5
II. STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), passed by Congress as Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968,16 prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin in the rental, sale, or financing of
residential housing.'" The Act encompasses both public and private
residences with only limited exceptions. 8 Further, the FHA prohibits
conversion of the courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating
forums." Id.
12. See Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 474; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). In Gladstone, the Court explained the use of
prudential principles in standing determinations as a way in which the judiciary seeks
"to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be
vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert
a particular claim." Id.
13. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
14. See Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 475, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
499.
15. Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). This "zone of inter-
est" test is analogous to the older "legal injury" requirement the Court relied upon in
determining basic article III standing issues prior to the Data Processing Service deci-
sion. The legal injury analysis covered only violations of a legal right protected by
common law or statute. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L.
Rnv. 450, 457 (1970) (discussion of the differences between injury-in-fact and legal in-
jury article III analysis). In Data Processing Service the Court recognized that interfer-
ence with the economic interest of freedom from competition was an injury-in-fact for
article III standing purposes, even though the interference failed to constitute a legal
injury. Data Processing Service, 397 U.S. at 153, 154.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
17. Id. at §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) exempts any single-family house sold or rented by its
owner. Section 3603(b)(2) exempts owner-occupied dwellings of four families or less.
Section 3607 exempts non-commercial housing operated by a religious organization or
by a private club.
1988]
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racial steering, a practice whereby persons such as real estate agents
direct potential buyers to different areas of a community according to
their race.19 Congress provided for the Act's enforcement through ad-
ministrative2 ' and judicial21 channels, each of which functions as an
alternative avenue of relief.22
The Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the FHA's enforce-
ment provisions effectively eliminated all prudential barriers to stand-
ing under the Act. The Court in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.23 and Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood24 found
that the FHA extended standing as far as permitted by article III.25 In
19. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982) (defining
racial steering); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979);
Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809
(1976).
20. Title VIII, § 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3610, entitled "Enforcement" provides in part:
(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory
housing practice that is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) .... [Within thirty
days after receiving a complaint... the Secretary shall investigate the complaint
and give notice in writing to the person aggrieved whether he intends to resolve it.
(d) ... If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary... the
Secretary has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the person
aggrieved may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action.., to en-
force the rights granted or protected by this title.
21. Title VII § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 "Enforcement by private persons" provides:
(a) The rights granted by §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606 of this title may be
enforced by civil actions.... [A] civil action shall be commenced within 180 days
after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred.
Title VIII § 813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 "Enforcement by Attorney General.. ." provides:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such denial
raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action.., against
the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of
rights....
22. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 104-08. The Court found no congressional intent to con-
dition access to the courts on a failure of an administrative resolution. Id. at 106.
Rather, the legislative history suggests that all Title VIII complainants were to have
available immediate judicial review. "The alternative, administrative remedy was then
offered as an option to those who desire to use it." Id. at 106.
23. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
25. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (the words authorizing an aggrieved person to bring
suit exhibit "Congressional intettion to define standing as broadly as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution"); Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 109 (citing Trafficante for the
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Trafficante the Court granted standing under section 810 of the Act to
both a black and a white tenant of the same housing unit who allegedly
suffered injury by the racially discriminatory management of the facili-
ties.26 The Court reasoned that while members of minority groups
most often experience discriminatory housing practices, white tenants
also have an interest in fair housing. Therefore, the exclusion of mi-
norities from the apartment complex injured both the white and black
residents.27
Relying on Trafficante, the Gladstone Court broadly construed the
standing requirement under section 812.28 The Court granted standing
to the Village of Bellwood and four of its residents to challenge the
alleged racial steering practices of real estate agents.2 9 The plaintiffs'
allegations that the agents' conduct caused Bellwood to lose its inte-
grated character were sufficient to satisfy the minimal article III injury-
in-fact requirement. 30 The Court did not decide whether two black
plaintiffs who lived outside of the community had standing. These
plaintiffs sued as "testers," persons not actually seeking housing but
investigating the alleged steering practices by posing as potential home
buyers.31 Despite these two decisions, lower federal courts continued
to require that a plaintiff show either a direct injury to her rights under
the FHA, or that she resided in a community adversely affected by
such a violation.
proposition that standing under § 812, like that under § 810, is "as broad as is permitted
by Article III...").
26. 409 U.S. at 212. The tenants each alleged that the owner of a San Francisco
apartment complex discriminated against non-whites on the basis of race in the rental of
units within the complex.
27. Id. at 209-10.
28. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 109; see supra note 25 and notes 20 and 21 for the provi-
sions of §§ 810 and 812.
29. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111, 115. The Court defines racial steering as "directing
prospective home buyers interested in equivalent properties to different areas according
to their race." Id. at 94.
30. Id at 115. In rejecting the defendant's argument that Trafficante limited stand-
ing to residents of the same apartment building, the Court stated:
The Constitutional limits of respondent's standing to protest the intentional segre-
gation of their community do not vary simply because that community is defined in
terms of city blocks rather than apartment buildings. Rather, they are determined
by the presence or absence of a 'distinct and palpable injury.'
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
31. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111. The Court did not address the question because the
plaintiffs did not emphasize the testers' claim in their briefs.
1988]
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The Supreme Court decided the issue of tester standing in Havens
Realty Corporation v. Coleman.32 Two individuals, one black and one
white, who worked as testers for a non-profit group, Housing Opportu-
nities Made Equal (HOME), sued an apartment complex owner for
engaging in racial steering.33 The black plaintiff alleged that the apart-
ment manager falsely stated that no apartments were available. On the
same day, however, the apartment manager informed the white tester
that apartments were available.34 Both testers and HOME also alleged
that Havens' practices "deprived them of the important social, profes-
sional, business, economic, political and aesthetic benefits of interracial
associations that arose from living in integrated communities free from
discriminatory housing practices."35
In reviewing Trafficante36 and Gladstone,37 the Havens Realty Court
confirmed that standing to sue under the FHA required only that one
establish an injury-in-fact resulting from the defendant's actions.3 8
The Court determined that the black tester suffered such an injury
when the defendant violated her statutorily created right to truthful
housing information.3 9 Since section 804 of the Act4° only prohibits
the dissemination of false housing information, the Court denied stand-
ing to the white tester because he failed to show how being told the
truth injured him.4' Determining that HOME had organizational
standing to sue, the Court held that the group suffered an injury-in-fact
if the defendant's steering practices impaired HOME's ability to pro-
vide counseling and referral services to people seeking low and moder-
32. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
33. Id. at 366-68. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1982) which prohibits representing "to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is
not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such a dwelling is in fact so available."
34. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 368.
35. Id. at 369.
36. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. 441 U.S. 91 (1979); see supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying text.
38. The Court in Havens Realty stated, "[The plaintiff [must] allege that as a result
of the defendant's actions he has suffered a 'distinct and palpable injury.'" 455 U.S. at
372, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
39. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 374. The Court looked to congressional intent
to answer the question of tester standing. Recognizing that an injury-in-fact could exist
"solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing
.... the Court determined that § 3604(d) creates a right to truthful information about
the availability of housing. Id See supra note 33.
40. Title VIII § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982); see supra note 33.
41. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374.
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ate income housing.42
Although it purported to adhere to case law extending standing
under the FHA4 3 to the "fullest extent permissible under Article
III, ' the Court in Havens Realty denied a white tester standing be-
cause she was told the truth.45 One commentator views this decision as
resurrecting the use of prudential rules to determine the existence of
FHA standing.4 6 Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that the
Court granted the black tester standing, based solely upon a violation
of a statutory right to truthful housing information, when the black
tester was not in fact seeking a place to live.47 Thus, the Havens Realty
decision appears to stretch article III to its limits.
The Supreme Court applies the article III standing requirements
alone in some cases, and in combination with prudential conditions in
others. This confusion is evidenced by lower courts' attempts to apply
42. Id, at 379. HOME also sued in its representative capacity for its members, but
settled with the defendants, agreeing not to seek injunctive relief; therefore, the Court
did not consider their representative standing. Id. at 378. See infra note 91.
The statute of limitations in § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982), barred the black tester's
claims because the violations were based on incidents that occurred more than 180 days
from the date the suit was filed. Id. at 381. However, the Court did not use the 180 day
limitation to bar to the claims of "neighborhood" plaintiffs, or to bar the claims by
HOME because their injuries were based on a continuing series of violations on a
number of occasions, at least one of which was within the 180 day period. Id
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
44. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying
text.
45. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 375. See supra note 39.
46. See Lebel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and An Alternative Frame-
work for Analysis, 6 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1023 (1982). The author opined if the Court was
"[t]o remain consistent with its past decision, [it] should acknowledge that a denial of
standing [to the white tester] for this reason does not proceed from a Constitutional
basis ...... Id. Lebel believes that the Court based its denial on prudential principles.
Id In this way, the judiciary can avoid questions of broad social import without vindi-
cating individual rights, and limit access to the courts to those litigants best suited to
assert a particular claim. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the prudential standing requirements.
47. See Civil Rights--Racial Discrimination-Fair Housing Act of 1968-Standing
for Testers, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 294, 307 (1982). This article discusses the confusion over
the difficulty in actually discerning the plaintiff's injury, and therefore, her personal
stake in the outcome ". . . beyond that of a concerned citizen interested in ensuring
equal housing opportunities for everyone." The author believes that the Court appar-
ently shared the lower court's view "that fair housing was such an important policy
concern that it warranted the extension of standing to testers, but preferred to justify
their decision with [article III] standing requirements."
1988]
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the Havens Realty rationale.48 The ability of a litigant to demonstrate
standing under the FHA, however, remains much easier than under
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act,49 under
which the Supreme Court has yet to resolve inconsistencies.
III. STANDING TO SUE UNDER TITLE I OF THE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT
Congressional enactment of the Fair Housing Act5" reflected the na-
tion's growing concern over the effects of discriminatory housing prac-
tices on inner cities and the urban poor.5 ' The FHA proscriptions
against discrimination in the sale or rental of property alone, however,
were inadequate to remedy the adverse physical effects on minority and
low income housing.52 Congress responded to the deterioration of
48. See Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 770 F.2d 1575 (1lth Cir. 1985) (standing
denied to the NAACP in its representative capacity and to its individual members for
failing to show any direct injury and for failing to overcome the prudential barrier to
raising the "putative" rights of third parties); Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760
F.2d 720, 722-24 (6th Cir. 1985) (a black resident, not himself steered away from the
city, satisfied article III standing requirements by establishing a "stigmatic" injury suf-
fered because the city's policy directly affected "his interest in his own self-respect, dig-
nity, and individuality." The court held plaintiff's stigmatic injury sufficient to support
standing); Heights Community Congress v. Hillstop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 139
(6th Cir. 1982) (reiterating the principle of broad article III standing under the FHA,
court granted standing to the City of Cleveland and a non-profit organization based on
their potential to be injured by defendant's alleged fair housing violations, holding the
plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to establish actual or threatened injury); Ohio Fair
Housing Congress v. Pierce, 639 F. Supp. 215, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (court denied
standing to non-profit housing corporation, holding that plaintiff's injury was not an
injury-in-fact to the organization as defined in Havens Realty, but only a hindrance to
abstract goals and interests of the organization); Profect Basic Tenants Union v. R.I.
Housing, 636 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (D.R.I. 1986) (citing Havens Realty for the principle
that in a FHA suit, court need not consider prudential standing concerns; plaintiff only
has to meet constitutional requirements. The court granted standing to a non-profit
housing organization which alleged sufficient injury to itself caused by defendants' de-
nial of open and integrated housing to low income minorities in a racially discrimina-
tory manner).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
50. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
51. See Developments in Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1681 (1978) (discussion of
the development of housing laws and their impact on exclusionary zoning practices of
suburbs which perpetuate urban ghettos and poverty).
52. Id. at 1681-82. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1982), which places a duty on the
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to "administer the
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirma-
tively to further the purposes of this subchapter."
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housing by passing Title I of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 (HCDA).5 3
The purposes of HCDA are to consolidate existing federal aid pro-
grams, establish new funding for developing viable urban communities,
and eliminate slums and blighted conditions while conserving and ex-
panding housing for persons of low and moderate incomes.5 4 Congress
conditions the use of federal grants and assistance under the HCDA on
the recipients' compliance with section 109, which prohibits discrimi-
nation under any program or activity funded in whole or in part with
federal monies." Section 109 also requires that HCDA recipients
comply with the provisions of the Fair Housing Act. 6 Unlike the
FH-A, the HCDA lacks a private enforcement provision, making it dif-
ficult for litigants to challenge the racially discriminatory use of federal
development funds.57
Prior to establishing standing, a plaintiff suing under the HCDA for
racially discriminatory use of federal grant monies must prove the
existence of a private cause of action. 8 In Montgomery Improvement
Association v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development59
the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had a private cause of action
under the anti-discrimination section of the HCDA. ° The court ap-
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
54. See S. REP. No. 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4273.
55. Title I § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1982).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(bX2) (1982), provides that any "grant will be conducted and
administered in conformity with... Public Law 90-284 [the Fair Housing Act]." The
most far-reaching funding programs are Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG), which provide funding under § 5306 of the HCDA to maintain and finance
existing programs until completion; and Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG),
under § 5318, which provide money to help fund new projects likely to attract invest-
ment. See H.R. REP. No. 236, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2884.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 5309(b), provides for enforcement of subsection A (the non-discrim-
ination clause), by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), who may operate through the state governor, refer the matter to the U.S.
Attorney General, or take other action, including the termination or reduction of
funding.
58. See Peoples Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the court determined that because no private cause of action existed
under the HCDA, inquiry into plaintiff's standing to sue was unnecessary).
59. 645 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 294. See 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1982).
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plied the four-part test articulated in Cort v. Ash 61 in determining
whether to imply private cause of action from a statute.62  The
Supreme Court in Cort held that a private cause of action may exist
where Congress passes a statute for a specified purpose. The Montgom-
ery court reasoned that because Congress passed the HCDA specifi-
cally to prohibit the expenditure of federal funds in a discriminatory
manner, the plaintiffs could pursue their claims. 63 The court also con-
cluded that "nothing in the Act suggest[ed] any Congressional purpose
to deny a private cause of action" in this case, since Congress intended
to benefit plaintiffs like these' by granting "persons of low and moder-
ate income certain rights" and prohibiting the discriminatory use of
funds.6
In contrast, the First Circuit adopted a strikingly different position
regarding the existence of a private cause of action under the HCDA.66
In Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing67 the court re-
fused to allow the plaintiff to maintain a private cause of action. 68 The
court rejected the Fifth Circuit's analysis, reasoning that the language
of section 109 must be viewed in context.69 The Latinos court, there-
61. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
62. Montgomery, 645 F.2d at 294. The Cort factors are:
(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy, or deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an area
basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (1975).
63. Id at 295. The court also relied heavily on Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979), which held that a woman alleging sexual discrimination by the
college had a private cause of action because the college received federal educational
funds. The college's actions violated § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Act of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982). Montgomery, 645 F.2d at 295. The Montgomery court ruled
§ 901(a) identical to § 109 of the HCDA, 42 U.S.C. § 5309, and therefore the Cannon
rationale applied to Montgomery. 645 F.2d at 295.
64. Id at 296.
65. Id at 297. See U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5304, and 5309.
66. See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d
774 (1st Cir. 1986).
67. Id at 793.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 5309.
69. Latinos, 799 F.2d at 793.
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fore, concluded that since the HCDA's primary objective was to de-
velop "viable urban communities,"'7 rather than to benefit a particular
class, Congress did not intend to confer federal rights and a private
cause of action to litigants. 71
Some courts deciding racial discrimination claims under Title I of
the HCDA72 avoid adjudicating the merits by utilizing a strict standing
analysis, rather than by denying a private cause of action to the plain-
tiffs. In HCDA litigation, courts focus on the last two prongs of the
article III standing requirements-the ability to trace the alleged injury
to the illegal conduct, and the probability that a favorable decision
would redress the injury 3 -rather than on the sole injury-in-fact
threshold used in fair housing cases.74
In Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority75 the plaintiffs
sued under the HCDA, charging that the Housing Authority acted in a
70. Iad at 794. The court stated that section 5309(a) reflects "the requirement that
federal fund recipients not discriminate, rather than an intent to benefit a special class.
By the time the HCDA was passed the language adopted for section 5309(a) was, in
effect, boilerplate non-discrimination language, and we thus attribute little to the choice
of form." Id.
The court in NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Pierce, 624 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (D. Mass.
1985), held that no implied right of action exists against HUD for violations of the
HCDA under § 808 of the FHA. The Pierce court found that section 808, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608, places an affirmative duty on the Secretary of HUD "to administer the pro-
grams and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner" that fur-
thers the F-A's purpose.
In Nabke v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 520 F. Supp. 5, 9 (W.D. Mich., S.D.
1981), the court held that the HCDA lacks an implied private remedy. The court dis-
tinguished Cannon, supra note 63, despite the similarity of HCDA § 109 and § 901(a) of
Title IX. The court found no evidence of congressional intent to provide a private cause
of action under the HCDA, and stated that awarding damages would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the program by diverting resources.
Peoples Hous. Dee. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
applied the Cort factors and held no private cause of action exists under § 5309(a) for a
developer challenging a city's alleged discriminatory rejection of a proposed low income
housing project. The court found that the intended occupants of the contemplated
housing financed under the HCDA were the only class of persons within the statute's
primary protection. 425 F. Supp. at 491. Furthermore, the court found nothing in the
legislative history of statute's language to support a finding of congressional intent to
maintain a private cause of action. Id Finally, the plain language of the statute in-
cludes only procedures and remedies which the Secretary may pursue. Id.
71. Latinos, 799 F.2d at 794.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
73. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
75. 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985).
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racially discriminatory manner by failing to urge certain municipalities
to construct public housing.76 The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing due to their failure to demonstrate a causal connection
between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct." Further-
more, the plaintiffs failed to meet the redressability test. The Jaimes
plaintiffs were unable to show whether a court order directed to the
Housing Authority ordering it to apply for housing building permits
would be effective, since local law did not require municipalities to pro-
vide low income housing to their residents.78
District courts apply the standing requirements more liberally than
do the federal circuit courts to litigants challenging the use of federal
grants under the HCDA. In Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 9 the trial court found
a private cause of action does exist under the HCDA.80 Furthermore,
the judge granted standing to the plaintiffs who alleged that HUD's
approval of grant applications contained inaccurate assessments of the
expected needs for low income housing.81 The court relied on the dis-
76. Id. at 1097.
77. Id.
78. Id. See also City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1052,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1976). Hartford denied standing to challenge the effect of
noncompliance with grant application procedures on low income residents because the
plaintiffs failed to trace their alleged injury to the unlawful conduct of the defendants.
The court also denied standing because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the redres-
sability of their injury. In Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 530 F.
Supp. 838, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge HUD's decision
approving the Huntington "zero" goals for new or rehabilitated construction because
even if HUD forced the town to include new goals, it would "not change the current
status quo since there are no [HUD] funds available... to subsidize such housing."
79. 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1978).
80. I& at 50. The court did not conduct the type of analysis undertaken in Mont-
gomery Improvement Ass'n v. HUD, 645 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981), or Latinos Unidos
de Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing, 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986). See supra notes 59-70
and accompanying text. The court in Coalition merely stated: "It is clear to us that
plaintiffs have a cause of action to challenge a grant after it has been approved." Coali-
tion, 450 F. Supp. at 50. One possible explanation is that the plaintiffs, in addition to
suing under the HCDA, charged that HUD's actions violated the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982). The court, however, did not make this distinction and
granted relief for HUD's violation of the HCDA.
81. 450 F. Supp. at 52. The plaintiffs, the NAACP, and minority residents of De-
troit, specifically charged that Livonia, a Detroit suburb, filed a deficient grant applica-
tion by failing to set forth goals to meet the low income housing needs of families
expected to reside in Livonia. Id. at 46. The plaintiffs felt this failure effectively barred
their future residence in the city and deprived them "of their rights to live in a racially
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senting opinion of Second Circuit Judge Oakes in City of Hartford v.
Town of Glastonbury,2 in which the majority denied plaintiffs standing
under the HCDA."3 Judge Oakes believed that Congress passed Title I
of the HCDA specifically to encourage cities receiving block grant
money to plan for minority and low income housing. 4 The Coalition
court therefore determined that if plaintiffs lacked standing under the
HCDA, Congressional intent could never be realized. 5 The court
granted standing by combining the injury-in-fact threshold with the
prudential requirement that the plaintiffs be within the zone of interests
protected by the statute.8 6 The court did not require the plaintiffs to
demonstrate a causal connection or the redressability of their claim.
Rather, the court accepted the plaintiffs' allegations that HUD's viola-
tion caused their injury. Plaintiffs met the zone of interest requirement
by showing that they were potential residents of the area targeted for
grant expenditures.8 7
The Massachusetts district court's decision in NAACP v. Harris88
was even more liberal than Coalition. In Harris, the court held that the
plaintiff's demonstration of injury-in-fact alone established standing to
challenge discriminatory administration of grants under two HCDA
programs.8 9 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Havens Re-
alty," the Harris court ruled that the NAACP may sue in its own
right, as well as in a representative capacity for its constituents, merely
by alleging that the organization suffered an injury from the discrimi-
and economically integrated environment." Id at 47. HUD's approval of Livonia's
application, therefore, violated the HCDA. Id.
82. 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1976); see supra note 78.
83. 561 F.2d 1032.
84. City of Hartford, 361 F.2d at 1056-59.
85. Coalition, 450 F. Supp. at 51. The court said: "We will not assume that Con-
gress passed a statute it knew could not be enforced." Id
86. Id. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
87. Coalition, 450 F. Supp. at 51-52; see Fox v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
468 F. Supp. 907, 914 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (relying on Coalition for the proposition that
"affected individuals have standing to challenge HUD's approval of a grant under the
1974 Act [HCDA]").
88. 567 F. Supp. 637 (D. Mass. 1983).
89. Id at 639-40. The allegations included the failure of the City of Boston to con-
dition the receipt of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) on the improve-
ment of the circumstances for black residents of the City, and the failure to provide low
income housing for minorities under the urban Development Action Grant (UDAG)
program.
90. 455 U.S. 363 (1982); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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natory practices.91 As in the Coalition decision,92 the Harris court did
not require a causal connection or redressability to determine the plain-
tiff's standing.93 The Harris court, however, went even further by not
imposing prudential barriers to the plaintiff's standing.
94
An analysis of the decisions under Title I of the HCDA95 does little
to suggest a framework for reconciliation. With some courts refusing
to recognize the existence of a private cause of action 96 and others de-
manding a litigant to demonstrate how enjoining the discriminatory
use of grant funds would improve the person's already bleak situa-
tion,97 a plaintiff cannot rely with any certainty on case law. 98
IV. CONCLUSION
From a policy standpoint, it is difficult to understand how the courts
justify allowing a person to sue for racial discrimination under the
FHA 99 merely by showing that she suffered an injury, while denying a
racial discrimination claim challenging the use of federal funds under
Title I of the HCDA.1° The different types of statutory enforcement
provisions °1 may partially explain the technical discrepancies in
standing analysis under each Act. Nevertheless, courts should read the
two statutes together, for several reasons: HCDA section 104 explic-
itly requires full compliance with the provisions of the Fair Housing
91. NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Mass. 1983); see supra note 42.
The Court in Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), did not
consider the question of representational standing. The Supreme Court decided that
issue in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 (1972), holding that if an organiza-
tion successfully alleged that it or its members suffered an injury, the Court would rec-
ognize standing.
92. 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1978).
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. See Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. Department of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 450 F. Supp. 43, 51 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1978). In Coalition the court utilized the
prudential "zone of interest" test along with the requirement of an injury-in-fact to
determine the plaintiff's standing. Coalition, 450 F. Supp. at 51. See supra notes 12-15
and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of prudential rules in standing
analysis.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
96. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 59-65 and 85-94 and accompanying text.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
101. See supra notes 20, 21, and 57.
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Act;' °2 section 808 of the FHA requires HUD to administer its urban
development programs in furtherance of fair housing policy;10 3 and the
HCDA's non-discrimination provision contains language reflecting an
underlying policy similar to the purpose declared in the Fair HousingAct.'0 4
Standing to sue is a condition precedent to the judicial resolution of
a claim.'0° Courts do not determine standing on the merits of the case.
Rather, standing merely concerns the ability of a litigant to get into
court. If a federally funded million dollar urban development'0 6 pro-
ject affects an area's residents in a racially discriminatory manner, is it
really in the best interests of society or the judicial system to deny them
standing to sue under the Housing and Community Development Act?
Courts must reconcile different standing rules under the HCDA °7
and under the Fair Housing Act. 0 8 Unless Congress clarifies its in-
tent, or the Supreme Court decides the issue, the standing dichotomy
will remain unresolved. Even if the Supreme Court recognizes the
existence of a private cause of action under the HCDA 1° 9 and holds
that the article III standing requirements apply to litigants, 1 demon-
strating the redressability of HCDA claims will remain difficult.
Courts have further confused the current status of standing under
the HCDA. For example, a court following Jaimes may require a
plaintiff seeking to challenge the discriminatory use of federal grants to
show personal benefit from an injunction.1 1 ' Of course, the court may
disregard the redressability issue altogether by following the decisions
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(bX2) (1982); see supra note 56.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1982); see supra note 52.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 5309(a) which prohibits discrimination against any person
"under any program or activity funded in whole or in part by funds made available..
under the HCDA.
105. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
106. In 1985 an estimated S3,900,000,000 was spent on the Community Develop-
ment Block Grant Program. STATSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNTrED STATES 1986
(106th ed.) at 268.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
109. See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing, 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir.
1986); contra Montgomery Improvement Ass'n v. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., 645 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
111. See 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying
text.
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in Coalition112 and Haris.113 The latter approach seems consistent
with the Court's adoption of the injury-in-fact test as the sole measure
of standing in Havens Realty,' 14 Gladstone, Realtors,"1 5 and Traf-
ficante.116 The injury-in-fact test complies with congressional intent to
define standing broadly under the FHA. Arguably, therefore, the
Supreme Court should extend the liberalized FHA standing require-
ments to claims under the HCDA, given Congress' desire that the
HCDA programs comply with the provisions of the FHA. Although
this approach may not guarantee consistent application of the standing
doctrine,117 basic guidelines for HCDA claims will, at last, be
established.
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nying text.
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